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ABSTRACT 
 
Numerous hedonic price analyses estimate price effects associated with hazardous waste 
site remediation or other environmental variation.  This paper estimates a neighborhood 
transition model to capture the direct price effect from Superfund site cleanup and the 
indirect price effects arising from residential sorting and changes in investment in the 
housing stock following cleanup.  First-difference models of neighborhood change and a 
national sample are used.  This approach fails to find consistent positive direct price 
effects.  Positive indirect effects, however, may arise through residential sorting and 
neighborhood investment spurred by remediation.  The findings can be sensitive to policy 
endogeneity and model specification.   
 
* We would like to thank Matthew Kahn, Geoffrey Turnbull, Jeffrey Zabel, and two 
anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  "This document contains demographic 
data from GeoLytics, E. Brunswick, NJ."  This material is based upon work supported by 
the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0433165. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hedonic price analysis (Rosen 1974) is frequently used to estimate the implicit 
price of structural or neighborhood characteristics.  It has often been applied to 
environmental goods such as proximity to hazardous sites.  There is a temptation to use 
the coefficients identified in the first-stage price regression from cross-sectional variation 
to predict within-unit price changes associated with policy shocks.  Yet, even if important 
concerns about unobservables are addressed, these hedonic estimates offer limited insight 
into how the change in environmental quality affects markets.  Other (nonprice) impacts 
on neighborhood composition are often overlooked.   
This paper proposes to extend the standard hedonic approach by tracing the 
pathways through which environmental change can affect price.  For prices to change, the 
new equilibrium requires some turnover in the housing market and, most likely, other 
shifts in neighborhood composition and characteristics of the housing stock.  
Neighborhood sorting occurs and reinvestment takes place as hazardous waste sites are 
cleaned up.  High demanders may bid up prices following improved environmental 
quality, yet the ensuing change in residents (and their houses, stores, etc.) will in turn 
affect observed prices.  If neighborhood characteristics affect price, the effect of clean-
ups on price through neighborhood transition and reinvestment will be important parts of 
the total effect of hazardous waste clean-ups.  Conventional studies that neglect the effect 
of environmental quality on neighborhood composition and investment decisions may 
miss these effects.       
 This paper uses panel data to estimate a system of equations that allows for 
endogeneity among prices, neighborhood characteristics, housing stock variables, and 
environmental quality.  Although the data are not ideal, our estimates of the direct effect 
of hazardous waste clean-ups resemble those estimated in other studies using sales data.  
However, our system of equations estimates allow us to compute the indirect effects as 
well, which improves our understanding of expected price changes.  We find some of 
these indirect effects to be substantively significant. 
 The implications of these results are threefold.  First, the presence of substantial 
indirect effects of changes in environmental quality should guide our interpretation of 
existing and future empirical estimates of price effects.  Second, the relative magnitude of 
the indirect effects suggests that these effects should be considered carefully in cost-
benefit analyses of hazardous waste clean-ups, or other policy interventions that might 
cause neighborhood transition.  Third, that sorting does appear to occur because of clean-
up activity has implications for the environmental justice literature.  Cross-sectional 
models of minority group exposure may not be adequate given these dynamic responses 
of housing markets to environmental improvements.   
 The rest of the paper runs as follows: Section II briefly reviews the relevant 
literatures.  Section III lays out the empirical model, derives the total effect of a clean-up, 
and describes the data.  Section IV presents the results, and Section V concludes. 
 
II. ANALYZNG THE EFFECTS OF SUPERFUND SITES 
The hedonic literature concerning price effects of Superfund NPL sites is sizable.  
Kiel and Williams (2007) provide a recent review.  While some studies, such as 
Greenberg and Hughes (1992) use simple means comparisons to draw inferences about 
the effects of environmental hazards on property values, most economic studies estimate 
price effects from first-stage hedonic regressions.  A review of at almost a dozen studies1 
that estimate comparable price effects for proximity to hazardous waste sites reveals 
some general tendencies.  Most include neighborhood-level demographic controls, while 
a few (e.g., Chattopadhyay et al. 2005, Kiel 1995) do not.  Six of these studies report 
adjacency effects, which range from -12% to 1% of the total property value.  The rest of 
the papers estimate price gradients around these sites.  These gradients range from 
insignificant to about six percent per mile away from the hazardous waste site, with most 
effects deemed insignificant between one and six miles from the site.  Ketkar (1992) used 
aggregated census data for the dependent variable.  In that New Jersey sample, hazardous 
waste sites account for 2% lower median housing values. 
The typical approach in this literature is to use results of a first-stage hedonic 
regression, where the key variable is some “distance to site,” often interacted with 
information about or clean-up status of the site.  This conventional research design 
essentially identifies changes in property values by comparing prices near the site with 
prices elsewhere (or by comparing prices before and after a change in status).  
Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) criticize this model specification as being particularly 
susceptible to omitted variable bias, especially using cross-sectional variation in prices 
and proximity to Superfund sites.  The present paper seeks to address Greenstone and 
Gallagher’s concerns through a panel structure and other efforts to mitigate omitted 
variable bias while also exploring nonprice effects of cleanups.  Recent work by Cameron 
and McConnaha (2006), Banzhaf and Walsh (2006), and Bayer et al. (2006) have all 
pointed to the important role of environmentally-induced migration.  If sorting occurs in 
housing markets, conventional hedonic models that include neighborhood composition 
variables risk including controls that are jointly endogenous.  Consistent estimates of 
price (and nonprice) impacts of environmental shocks involves careful attention to both 
unobservables and the interdependence of price and neighborhood dynamics. 
The co-location of NPL sites and residents is a major policy issue, especially in 
terms of the equity of exposure.  The environmental justice movement and literature have 
often focused on hazardous waste facilities.  To varying degrees, assessments of 
distributional equity have accounted for migration and sorting in response to siting 
decisions.  Been (1997), Anderton et al. (1994), and Baden and Coursey (2002) all cast 
doubt on the hypothesis that siting follows race.  Alternatively, Hamilton (1995) finds 
facility expansions to follow neighborhoods where collective political action was 
weakest.  Gayer (2000) finds likewise for levels of risks, while Shapiro (2005) finds 
similarly for changes in risk levels.  One implication is that the EPA may base decisions 
about cleanup, in part, on the political influence of a community.  Another implication is 
that surprisingly little work exists in the environmental justice literature that explicitly 
measures a dynamic model where households migrate and environmental quality 
improves.  Most of these studies examine sorting around existing sites.  Far less effort has 
gone into rigorously investigating neighborhood transition in the wake of Superfund site 
remediation.  If there are price effects associated with environmental remediation, then 
neighborhood sorting should follow.  While this dynamic has yet to be observed 
following siting, at least in the environmental justice literature (Ringquist 2006), we offer 
new evidence on sorting following remediation.  Moreover, shifts in rentership rates are 
also estimated, with implications for whether residents can capture subsequent property 
value gains (see discussion in Sieg et al. 2004). 
  
III. THEORY AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
A. Theoretical model 
In general, hedonic studies use cross-sectional data to estimate a first-stage 
equation of the form: 
(1) itiGitMitNitSitEtit GMNSEP 10 εββββββ ++++++=  
where t indexes time, i indexes individual housing units, P is the house value, E measures 
environmental quality (which is a negative function of the presence of a polluted site), S 
is a vector of structural characteristics of a property, N is a set of neighborhood 
demographic characteristics, M is a vector of characteristics of the municipality that may 
vary over time and also affect prices, and G is a set of time-invariant characteristics that 
affect price (such as distance to the CBD).  The hedonic price, βE, is typically taken to 
also represent the willingness to pay – by the marginal consumer in that housing market – 
for a marginal increase in environmental quality. 
One potential problem with a simple OLS approach to the hedonic equation in 
levels is that some of the components of G will be unobserved and correlated with the 
other variables of interest.  To mitigate this problem, we estimate the model in first 
differences (Mendelsohn et al. 1992, Zabel 1999).  This strategy purges our parameter 
estimate of bias from the omission of time-invariant variables, and we thus identify the 
parameters from within-observation changes in environmental quality, neighborhood 
demographic conditions, and structural characteristics, as in Equation (2): 
(2) ititMitNitSitEit MNSEP 10 εβββββ  +++++=  
where 1,, −−= titiit XXX  for any variable X. 
In this paper, we consider the possibility that Equation (2) is part of a larger 
system in which many of the key variables are set simultaneously.  Estimating the system 
that simultaneously determines prices and housing and demographic characteristics 
reveals the direct price effects of environmental clean-ups and enables us to map the 
pathways through which the indirect effects arise.  Our model of structural characteristics 
explains observed levels of S by the lagged level of S and the other variables in the 
system: 
(3) itiGitMitNitEtitSit GMNESS 201 εγγγγγγ ++++++= −  
Here, the housing stock depends on its past levels and environmental quality, 
neighborhood demographics, and other considerations.  Again, taking first-differences to 
control for time-invariant unobservables yields: 
(4) ititMitNitEitSititit MNESSSS 2011 εγγγγγ  +++++=−= −−  
Surely, all of these adjustments will be gradual in the aggregate, as the existing stock, 
built before the changes occurred, will not instantaneously be demolished and rebuilt at 
the new equilibrium specifications.2  That is, if there are no changes in environmental 
quality, neighborhood demographics, or other considerations, the housing stock in an area 
will continue its path towards long-run equilibrium.  However, if environmental quality 
suddenly improves, it might cause people to change the kinds of housing they build.3  
Likewise, neighborhood demographics such as family size and income will also affect the 
equilibrium quantity and quality of the housing stock if the demand for housing is related 
to these demographics.  
 A similar argument holds for neighborhood demographic characteristics.  Let the 
observed neighborhood demographics be explained by: 
(5) itiGitMitSitEtitNit GMSENN 301 εδδδδδδ ++++++= −  
Taking first-differences yields:   
(6) ititMitSitEitNititit MSENNNN 3011 εδδδδδ  +++++=−= −−  
Thus, N follows a partial adjustment process, where changes in environmental quality, 
prices, structural characteristics, and other factors all explain the observed changes in 
neighborhood demographics.  Demographic groups’ differing demands for E may cause 
them to sort into neighborhoods according to their willingness to pay for these attributes 
(Diamond and Tolley 1982).  Similarly, changes in housing stock may attract different 
types of residents, at least when the capital stock is somewhat inelastic. 
Rearranging terms and rewriting the first-differenced system in matrix notation 
yields Equation (7). 
(7) 
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where 1−−= tt XXX  for any variable X. 
 In this paper, we are specifically interested in the effects of E , especially when E 
changes due to policy intervention, as in the case of Superfund site clean-ups.  Given the 
system of Equations (7), the total effect of a clean-up ( E ) can be seen to depend not 
solely on its direct effect (βE), but also on its indirect effects.  Totally differentiating and 
dividing through by Ed  , while recognizing the lagged differences in P, S, and N will not 
depend on E , yields: 
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We can then use Cramer’s Rule to obtain the total effect of a change in E: 
(8) 
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The first term in the numerator is the direct effect on price.  The second and third terms in 
the numerator are the first-order indirect effect: E ’s effect on P  through S  and N .  The 
third and fourth terms are the second-order indirect effects: E ’s effect on P  through S ’s 
effect on N  and N ’s effect on S .  The final term corrects for double counting.  The 
denominator is a sort of multiplier effect.  If there is no endogeneity in Equation (7),4 this 
total derivative reduces to the first three terms in the numerator.   
 In this application, the system of equations is considerably more complex because 
S, N, and M are vectors of many variables.  Hence, in Equation (3), we assume that each 
variable in S depends on its own lag, the vectors E, N, M, and G, and the 
contemporaneous values of the other variables in S.  Likewise, in Equation (5), each N 
variable depends on its own lag, the vectors E, S, M, and G, and the contemporaneous 
values of the other variables in N.  The system in Equation (7) thus has each S  and N  
equation dependent on that variable’s own lagged difference, E , the other variables in 
the S  and N  vectors, and additional municipal-level controls in the exogenous M  
vector.  The time-invariant vector of geographic controls, G, drops entirely out of the 
system when first-differenced, assuming time-invariant parameters βG, γG, and δG.     
An alternative model of the system might allow for property values to enter into 
Equations (3) and (5) directly.  Thus, they appear as: 
(3a) itiGitMitPitNitEtitSit GMPNESS 201 εγγγγγγγ +++++++= − . 
(5a) itiGitMitPitSitEtitNit GMPSENN 301 εδδδδδδδ +++++++= − . 
In Equation (3a), the substitution towards different types of housing when property prices 
rise suggests an important role of P in explaining S.  Similar arguments hold for the 
inclusion of P in Equation (5a): higher property values may attract different types of 
residents.  First-differencing these equations completes the alternative system.   
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In this alternative model, as above, each S  and N  equation depends on that variable’s 
own lagged difference, E , P , the exogenous M  vector, and the other variables in the 
N  and S   vectors, respectively. 
 
B. Estimation approach 
 To identify the parameters in Equation (8), we estimate the system of Equations 
(7).  In this framework, the preferred data set would include a national sample6 of 
properties and a rich set of housing and resident characteristics over time.  The two most 
obvious candidates (the American Housing Survey and the Public Use Micro Sample) 
only provide geographic information at the county-level.  Since the effects of hazardous 
waste sites have been found to be highly localized (Hite et al. 2001, Mendelsohn et al. 
1992), such large geographic scales are inadequate for our purposes.   
 In the absence of national microdata, we use aggregate measures of housing and 
population characteristics at the neighborhood (block group) level.  Using block-group 
averages and medians, we wish to see how neighborhood transitions induced by site 
clean-ups affect total changes in prices.  There are some advantages to this level of 
aggregation (Goodman 1977).  Coulton et al. (2004) show that the block group matches 
survey respondents’ perceptions of “neighborhood” better than other available levels of 
aggregation.  We use U.S. census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000, processed by 
Geolytics, Inc. so that block-group boundaries do not change from decade to decade.  
This geographic consistency across years enables panel data analysis.  We treat block 
groups, the smallest level of aggregation for which our data are available, as the unit of 
analysis in the first-difference approach.     
The use of aggregated data, even at the neighborhood level, limits our ability to 
infer price effects at the individual level.  Nonetheless, some hedonic research has shown 
that estimates using aggregate data produce reasonably accurate results (Freeman 1979, 
Nelson 1979, O’Byrne et al. 1985).7  Moreover, the median housing value in a 
neighborhood is of considerable policy import.  Learning more about the effects of clean-
ups on this neighborhood measure is informative, even if it does not recover the true 
underlying hedonic price.  The results based on such aggregate measures can be viewed 
in an epidemiological light: the effects of average exposure on average outcomes, while 
not the ideal, are nonetheless interesting.   
The estimation strategy employed here attempts to avoid two kinds of bias that 
would result from estimating Equations (1), (3), and (5) with OLS.  The first arises from 
time-invariant omitted variables.  If we had no time-invariant omitted variables and good 
instruments, then estimating Equations (1), (3), and (5) in levels would be sufficient and 
straightforward.  Yet, to address the serious concerns about unobservable individual-level 
effects and to help with our search for instruments, we estimate the system in first-
differences.  This recovers the same set of parameters as found in the system in levels by 
relying on observations of how these variables respond to changes in the environmental 
good (something that would not be possible with cross-sectional data alone).  
Another source of bias in all three equations stems from endogeneity in the 
system.8  Equation (4) has changes in structural characteristics depending on changes in 
neighborhood demographics just as Equation (6) has demographic trends following from 
changes in the housing stock.  Equation (7a) states that appreciation rates are affected by 
changes in the structural characteristics while also stating that those changes depend in 
part on the appreciation rate.  To correct for this endogeneity, we estimate Equation (7) as 
a system of simultaneous equations.  Having differenced out all time-invariant 
determinants of P, S, and N, the search for instruments is made somewhat less arduous.  
With a few exceptions, we use twice-lagged levels of each variable as instruments. 
 The consistency of our estimator depends on the validity of our instruments.  
Under the assumption of white noise error terms in (7), the twice-lagged levels of each 
variable serve as valid instruments.  This follows the recommendations of Arellano 
(1989).  Thus, while tε  and 1−tε  must be uncorrelated, this implies εt and εt-2 are 
uncorrelated for each equation in the system in (7).  Sargan tests of overidentification and 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity – both of which are performed on the 2SLS 
estimation of each equation in the system – serve as diagnostic checks for the validity of 
these assumptions with these data.   
 
C. Variables and Descriptive statistics 
 Data from several sources are combined to estimate the model.  The results are 
presented in section IV, emphasizing the estimation of the P  equation in (4).  P  is the 
change in the block group’s log of median house value from 1990 to 2000.     
 Our variable of interested is E , which represents EPA clean-up activity over the 
1990’s.  Derived from public EPA data (EPA 2003), this variable equals one if a block 
group contains a site that was deleted or partially deleted from the NPL during the 1990s.  
This is the most complete and final designation of a hazardous waste site, indicating that 
the EPA is satisfied that the site has been cleaned enough to pose no further health risk.  
This change in status, more than mere listing or incomplete remediation, should represent 
improved environmental quality (Greenstone and Gallagher 2005).  Because the policy 
variable, E , may not be exogenous, we also estimate models with an instrumented E  
(discussed in detail in section D below) to assess the sensitivity of the results.   
 S  is a vector of housing characteristics expected to affect prices at an individual 
as well as an aggregate level.  S  includes changes in eight variables: median year built of 
housing units, average number of rooms per unit, percent of housing units with gas or 
electric heating, housing density (housing units per square mile), percent of units in small 
buildings (containing four or fewer housing units), percent of housing units with 
complete plumbing, average number of bedrooms, and the percent of housing units that 
are stand-alone.   
 Neighborhood demographic characteristics ( N ) include the changes in the 
following eleven variables: log of the neighborhood median household income; percent 
population that is white but not Hispanic; percent population aged 25 or older who have 
completed at least a bachelor’s degree; percent population below 1.5 times the poverty 
level; percent of the population employed in manufacturing, warehousing, transportation 
or utilities industries; percent renter-occupied housing, percent population aged under 18 
years; average commute time for people working outside the home; percent of 
households who do not have a vehicle available; population density; and average people 
per housing unit.   
 The M vector captures the conditions of the municipality or Census “place”.  
Ideally, M  would measure changes in important variables like school quality, crime, and 
public finance attributes of the area.  Such variables are unavailable, however, for the 
nationwide sample and appropriate dates (1980-2000) needed in this analysis.  Proxies 
are constructed using first-differences in the following place-level variables: number of 
households, median housing value, median rent, median household income, percent of 
households with children under 18, and percent of households that are married families 
with kids.  This approach groups observations not in an MSA into a single rural group to 
compute the group-level trends. 
 Time-invariant components of G will cancel out in the first-difference estimation.  
If we relax the assumption of constant hedonic prices for these characteristics, however, 
geographic variables may re-enter the model.  The βG would then reflect the change in 
the hedonic price from 1990 – 2000.  The same applies for the other equations for 
structural and neighborhood characteristics.  To account for possible changing influence 
of unobserved MSA-level characteristics in the various equations in the system, all 
models are estimated with MSA-level fixed effects.  By subtracting the MSA-level means 
from each variable, the models effectively control for changing prices (and other levels of 
S and N) at the metropolitan level over the 1990s.  Relaxing the assumption of time-
invariant prices also allows a richer set of geographic controls, G, to enter the price 
equation in some specifications.9  The G vector includes a natural amenity index 
computed at the county level by the USDA ERS (USDA 1999) and a set of interactions 
between MSA dummies and distance to CBD, which was derived from various Census 
TIGER files and the National Atlas of the United States (2004).  By including these time-
invariant factors in our price model, it allows housing price trends to vary according to 
climate and topography, and across and within MSAs.  Table 1 presents the variable 
names, descriptions and descriptive statistics of all the variables described above. 
 
Table 1: Variable Names, descriptions and descriptive statistics.  
Vector Name Descriptiona Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
P  Price 
Difference in log of median value, owner-
occupied housing 0.3589 0.322 
E  
Clean-up, 
own/adjacent 
Own or adjacent block group has an NPL 
site deleted from list 0.0053 0.073 
E  NPL in 1990, own/adjacent 
Own or adjacent block group had an NPL 
site as of 1990 0.0544 0.227 
S  
Year built Difference in median year structure was built 3.3446 20.190 
Rooms Difference in average number of rooms in housing units 0.1058 0.457 
Utility heat Difference in percent housing units with gas or electric heat 0.0492 0.102 
Housing density Difference in housing units per mile2 52.8743 702.253 
Small structures 
Difference in percent housing units 
sharing structure with 4 or less housing 
units 
0.0004 0.080 
Plumbing Difference in percent housing units w/ complete plumbing -0.0007 0.028 
Bedrooms Difference in average number of bedrooms in housing units 0.0071 0.243 
Solo unit 
Difference in percent housing units not 
sharing structure with any other housing 
units 
0.0031 0.091 
N  
Income Difference in log of median household income 0.3343 0.231 
White Difference in percent non-Hispanic white population -0.0678 0.110 
College Difference in percent population age 25+ with at least college degree 0.0486 0.079 
Vector Name Descriptiona Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Poor Difference in percent population with income under 1.5 poverty line -0.0031 0.099 
Blue collar Difference in percent workers employed in “industrial” sectors -0.0622 0.087 
Renter Difference in percent occupied housing units that are renter-occupied -0.0053 0.096 
Children Difference in percent population aged 18 or younger -0.0023 0.062 
Commute Difference in average travel time for those working outside of home 2.092 4.943 
No vehicle Difference in percent of households with no vehicle available -0.0056 0.067 
Population density Difference in people per mile2 199.2871 2117.182 
Household size Difference in people per housing unit -0.0099 4.966 
M  
PlaceHouseholds Difference in place-level number of households 18019.47 42207.37 
PlaceValue Difference in place-level median housing 
value 34706.75 34466.24 
PlaceRent Difference in place-level median rent 41.9863 80.549 
PlaceIncome Difference in place-level median 
household income 10366.28 4852.253 
PlaceKids Difference in place-level percent of 
households with children aged 18 or less -0.0095 0.029 
PlaceFamilies Difference in place-level percent of 
households that are married with children -0.0240 0.028 
G 
Natural amenities 
scale 
county-level amenity index  
(composed of topography, temperatures, 
humidity, and sunlight) 
1.0601 3.209 
Distance log of distance to historic city center 2.8742 0.818 
MSA × Distance MSA-specific log of distance to historic city center 
  
a All variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000, except for E and level variables in G.  Even 
though variables in Table 1 appear in their raw form, all models are estimated after subtracting MSA-
level averages from all variables. 
 
 To identify the system in Equation (7), numerous instruments are needed.  The 
system has 20 equations (for P , S , N ) and 39 endogenous variables when the lagged 
differences of S and N are also included.  In each equation, however, there are only 20 
endogenous variables: the 19 endogenous differences and one endogenous lagged 
difference.  The system includes exogenous M  as regressors in each equation.  Excluded 
instruments include the twice-lagged levels of all P, S, and N variables.10  The three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) approach estimates all endogenous variables using the E , Pt-2, St-2, 
Nt-2, and tM  as independent variables.  Then, the instrumented versions of the 
endogenous variables are used to estimate the equations in the system simultaneously, 
allowing for across-equation correlations in the errors.  The 20 exclusion restrictions 
(twice-lagged levels of P, S, and N) overidentify each of the equations’ 19 endogenous 
regressors (the S  and N  vectors, except for the dependent variable being replaced by its 
lagged difference).  A Sargan test of overidentification (with one degree of freedom) 
offers a specification test for each of the equations. 
The alternative model (equation 7a) differs slightly in that each S  and N  
equation also includes an endogenous P  regressor.  It uses an identical instrument set. 
The exclusion restrictions (20 twice-lagged levels from P , S , and N ) just identify the 
endogenous variables in each of the S  and N  equations (where all of the P , S , and N  
variables appear in each, except for the dependent variable being replaced by its lagged 
difference) and overidentify the price equation (because the lagged difference of price 
does not appear).  A Sargan test is available for the price equation. 
 
D. Endogeneity Issues with E  
 Up to this point, we have maintained the assumption that while P, S, and N are 
determined simultaneously, EPA clean-ups are determined exogenously (i.e., E  is 
uncorrelated with iε  in equations 7 or 7a).  This assumption may not hold.  Empirically, 
Viscusi and Hamilton (1999) show that the clean-up standard chosen by the EPA depends 
on some demographic characteristics of the area surrounding the site.  On the other hand, 
Hird (1993, 1994) shows that the demographics of the county which contains a site has 
little effect on the progress of a site through remediation.  Gupta et al. (1996) found 
similar results: that clean up decisions for NPL sites were more related to clean up costs 
and risk factors than to neighborhood demographics.  More recently, Daley and Layton 
(2004) predict site progress through remediation and find no significant effects of area 
demographics.  These studies offer little evidence that deletion, our variable of interest, 
hinges much on unexplained changes in P, S, and N.   
 Because all of these studies are done conditional on the presence of a hazardous 
waste site, the exogeneity of clean-ups among sites might not generalize to our more 
inclusive sample.  Even in our first-differencing context, this should concern us because 
neighborhoods experiencing clean-ups will be neighborhoods that contained sites in 1990 
(i.e., Et-1 and E  are highly correlated).  If neighborhoods with Superfund sites in 1990 
tended to have systematically higher or lower residual appreciation rates, the βE could be 
biased.  To control for this possibility, we will also estimate models on the subset of 
neighborhoods that contained sites in 1990.  In this subsample, we were unable to reject 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of E  in most of our equations using a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test.  Thus, we feel it is safe to take clean-up as exogenous, conditional on the 
presence of a site.  We report results from models run on the full sample with (Models 2 
and 4) and without (Models 1 and 3) instrumenting for E .  We also report comparable 
results for models run on the subsample of observations with sites as of 1990 (Models 1’ 
and 3’).  
 Along the lines of Gayer (2000), we consider an instrumented version of E  in 
Models 2 and 4.  Eˆ  is estimated from a probit of Pt-2, St-2, Nt-2, Et-1, site-specific 
characteristics, and a variety of other measures from 1980.11  The site-specific 
characteristics include the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) score of the closest site, a 
dummy variable if the HRS score is missing for that site, and the years elapsed since the 
closest site was first “discovered” by the EPA for inclusion on the NPL.  As every 
observation (i.e., block group) has a closest NPL site, the HRS variable should say little 
about the environmental quality of the observation; merely it should indicate the 
likelihood of that site to be cleaned up (Hird 1990, Layton and Daley 2004).  Likewise, 
the time elapsed since discovery should affect the likelihood of clean-up rather than 
environmental quality of that neighborhood.  This instrumented version, Eˆ , replaces E  
in Models 2 and 4. 
 The concern that E  may be correlated with other unobservables that belong in the 
empirical model motivates several additional models.  First, Model 1’ represents Model 1 
except with only the subsample of neighborhoods with NPL sites in 1990.  Second, 
Model 2 duplicates Model 1 except that E  is replaced by Eˆ .  Third, the possibility of 
time-varying hedonic prices (β) is explored in Models 2G and 2EG.12  Even an 
instrumented Eˆ  might give biased price effects if clean-ups tend to occur in areas that 
tended to experience changes in price (due to either demand or supply shocks) during the 
1990s.  Suppose that clean-ups occurred in areas with an NPL site in 1990 or with a rainy 
climate.  Obviously, both attributes are time-invariant and thus cannot explain 
appreciation rates during the 1990s, unless hedonic prices changed during that time.  The 
assumption of time-invariant effects for levels of Et-1 and G are relaxed in order to control 
for the possibility that clean-ups tended to occur in areas that experienced price changes.  
Models 2G and 4G include in the price equation the G vector of the natural amenity 
scale, distance to city center, and MSA-specific distances.  Letting prices for these 
attributes vary controls for the possibility that, for instance, if downtown areas tended to 
get clean-ups and also tended to see large price increases during the 1990s, then βE might 
be biased upwards without controlling for distance-to-downtown.  Finally, Models 2EG 
and 4EG include both the G vector and the Et-1, allowing for the possibility that block-
groups with or near NPL sites in 1990 were somehow different than other areas and 
followed a different price path over the 1990s.  Table 2 summarizes the differences 
between models. 
Table 2:  Summary of Models 
Model Equation Sample Vectors included 
1 (2)  OLS Full S , N , M , E  
1’ (2)  OLS NPL in 1990 only S , N , M , E  
2 (2)  OLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ  
2G (2)  OLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ , G  
2EG (2)  OLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ , E , G  
3 (7)  3SLS Full S , N , M , E  
3’ (7)  3SLS NPL in 1990 only S , N , M , E  
4 (7)  3SLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ  
4G (7)  3SLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ , G  
4EG (7)  3SLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ , E , G  
3a (7a)  3SLS Full S , N , M , E  
3a’ (7a)  3SLS NPL in 1990 only S , N , M , E  
4a (7a)  3SLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ  
4Ga (7a)  3SLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ , G  
4EGa (7a)  3SLS Full S , N , M , Eˆ , E , G  
 
IV.  RESULTS 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating alternative P  equations based on 
Equation (2).  Table 4 summarizes the results of estimating several alternative 
specifications of the neighborhood transition and NPL clean-up system in Equation (7).  
Table 4a does likewise for the alternative system in Equation (7a).  (Note that the price 
equation is the same in both Equation (7) and (7a), leaving OLS estimates of the P  
equation identical.)  Model 1 is just a first-differenced price equation, Equation (2), 
where S  and N  are treated as exogenous.  Model 3 refers to the system in Equation (7), 
including the P  equation and 19 equations for vectors S  and N .  Models 2 and 4 
replicate Models 1 and 3, respectively, except that the instrumented version Eˆ  replaces 
E .  Models 1’ and 3’ correspond to Models 1 and 3 except they are estimated using the 
restricted sample of only block groups that contained NPL sites in 1990 or are adjacent to 
those block groups.  This sample restriction reduces the sample size from about 200,000 
to about 11,000. 
Estimates of Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 show median housing value changing 
with changes in structural and demographic characteristics of the neighborhood.  The 
initial first-difference price regression offers results generally consistent with 
expectations and previous literature.  The effects of these controls are relatively stable 
across models in Table 3, especially for the full sample.  Newness, rooms, plumbing, 
income, percent white, education, absence of poverty, and shorter commutes are all 
associated with higher prices in the OLS model.  Model 1’ shows that a somewhat 
different set of prices may hold in the subsample.  Otherwise, the OLS models explain 
about 22% of the variation in appreciation rates in block groups in fairly standard ways.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
NPL site clean-up is associated with a 3.7% rise in prices in Model 1 (with a 95% 
confidence interval of 2.1-5.3%).  This direct effect is robust to a variety of other 
controls, removing the MSA-level fixed effects, or even restricting the sample to only 
block-groups with or near an NPL site 1990.  Model 1’ shows a 4.2% direct price effect 
of clean-ups among the smaller sample.  Instrumenting for E  in Model 2, on the other 
hand, essentially eliminates the direct price effect.  The largest effect is seen in Model 
2EG, where the direct price effect is estimated to be 5.8% but with a 95% confidence 
interval ranging from -3.9% to 15.5%.  OLS estimates an effect size of E  to be about 
4%, whether in the full sample or only among areas with or near NPL sites, while the 
price effect of Eˆ  is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Overall, these results are 
within the range of the findings referenced in Section II.   
 The direct price effects of clean-ups are estimated in Tables 4 and 4a using the 
3SLS approach.  Depending on the modeling assumptions and sample, the estimated 
price effects range from -9.5% to 6.5% in Table 4, but only the estimate in Model 3 is 
significantly different from zero.13  The alternative models in Table 4a exhibit a similar 
range in estimates, although most are closer to zero.14  The model that includes Et-1 
proves to be the exception, with the price effect of Eˆ  tending to be more negative in 
Model 4EGa than its counterpart in Model 4EG.  In Model 3a, median property values in 
block groups with or near clean-ups appreciate a statistically insignificant 2.7% faster 
than other block groups.  The instrumented clean-up variable produces very similar direct 
price effects in Model 4a.  Among neighborhoods with or near NPL sites, however, block 
groups with remediations actually appreciate 1.6% more slowly on average.  Only when 
Et-1 and G are included does the direct price effect of instrumented clean-ups become 
statistically different from zero.  In Model 4EGa, block groups experiencing remediations 
exhibit 20.7% lower appreciation rates than comparable properties.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 4a about here] 
Comparing across Tables 4 and 4a, the results broadly suggest a small and noisy 
direct price effect from de-listings under the null of exogenous clean-ups, and this effect 
erodes further when clean-ups are instrumented.  Omitting the initial proximity to old 
hazardous waste sites from the model may upwardly bias the price effect of E  or Eˆ .  
Apparently those neighborhoods around NPL sites circa 1990 experienced above average 
appreciation during the 1990s.  This weak result, that βE may be incorrectly attributing 
some of the price growth in “dirty” neighborhoods to the clean-ups that occurred in some 
of them, is evident from comparing βE in Models 3 and 3’, and 4G and 4EG.  The similar 
pattern of upward bias holds in Table 4a.  The bias is so strong in the alternative Model 
4EGa that the negative direct price effect actually becomes significant.  Otherwise, the 
evidence in Tables 4 and 4a point to consistently small and insignificant effects of clean-
ups. 
This result resembles the OLS results presented in Table 3, but it contrasts with 
much of the hedonic literature on Superfund sites.  These single-site studies often find 
significant price effects on properties even farther away than one or two block groups.  
Kiel and Williams (2006) are an exception in this literature, where their multi-site 
approach finds positive price effects of proximity over time for some of their sample.  In 
addition, our results suggest that unobservables associated with the neighborhoods 
around NPL sites and, in particular, sites experiencing remediations may bias the 
observed price effects.15   
 The effects of clean-ups on neighborhood composition and housing stock are 
presented in the bottom panels of Table 4 and Table 4a.  In many cases, NPL site clean-
ups are associated with significant changes in structural and demographic changes in the 
neighborhood.  In Model 3, E  predicts newer housing, a larger share of housing with gas 
or electric heat, and larger shares of small structures and blue-collar workers.  In the 
smaller sample in Model 3’, E  is insignificant in all of the other equations in the system.  
Instrumenting for E  in an auxiliary regression leads to generally larger (and more 
significant) effects of Eˆ  in the other equations in the system.  These effects differ 
depending on whether Et-1 or G are included.  Some consistent effects are evident, 
however.  The positive effect of Eˆ  on Years built and negative effect on Income and Blue 
collar appear to be the result of omitting Et-1, a measure of baseline neighborhood 
environmental quality.  Areas with or near NPL sites in 1990 tended to become newer, 
poorer, and less blue collar over the 1990s, rather than just the areas experiencing 
remediations.  Model 4EG, which includes Et-1 in each of the S  and N  equations and 
uses both Et-1 and G as exogenous instruments in the first stage, finds several significant 
non-price effects of clean-ups.  Neighborhoods with or near a clean-up tend to gain more 
rooms per housing unit but fewer bedrooms per unit, a larger share of units using utilities 
for their heat, a larger share of nonwhite residents, a larger share of units occupied by 
renters, and shorter commutes.  As shown in the top panel of Table 4, some of these 
affected variables are significant in the hedonic price equations; others are not.  
Interestingly, block-groups nearby NPL deletions during the 1990s did not appear to 
become much wealthier, more white and educated, and more family friendly as some 
might expect.   
The alternative models in Table 4a show roughly similar effects of clean-ups on 
neighborhood composition when the effects are significant.  With population densities 
rising and median building age becoming younger, one might conclude that new housing 
is being built as new residents move into these areas.  This provides some evidence for 
both supply and demand effects of changes in environmental quality.   
Although housing markets and residential sorting mechanisms appear responsive 
to changes in environmental quality, direct price estimates, from neighborhood-level 
hedonic analyses (as in Models 1 or 2) or from systems models (as in Models 3 or 4), 
capture only part of the effect of clean-ups on prices.  The full price effect of an NPL 
clean-up can be calculated via equation 9 or 9a.  These effects appear in Table 5 along 
with direct price effects reprinted from Table 4.   
 In most of the models estimated, the indirect effect goes in the opposite direction 
of the direct effect.  Relative to the standard errors for βE, these indirect effect sizes are 
often fairly small.  Two exceptions arise in Models 3’ and 4EG – both of which control 
for Et-1 either by directly including it or by restricting the sample.  Clean-ups in either 
case do not have significant direct price effects, but they do induce changes in 
demographics and housing stock such that prices substantially rise.  The indirect price 
effect in Model 3’, which uses a sample restriction to mitigate the policy endogeneity, 
appears substantively large and positive.  The net price effect of clean-ups among the 
eligible neighborhoods is a 3.8% increase, which is a substantial improvement over the 
4.3% decrease that would be expected under a clean-up if the neighborhood dynamics 
were held fixed.  Using G as instruments and including G in the price equation in the full 
sample also obtains positive indirect price effects.  On net, the flexible full-sample 
specification with MSA-specific effects of proximity to city center predicts 7.8% higher 
property values in block groups with or near NPL deletions.  This positive price effect, 
however, arises through neighborhood change occurring and influencing price.  Direct 
price effects alone tend not to be positive and significant in these models.  Overall, the 
results suggest two things: (1) the direct price effects are not large and positive; and (2) 
allowing for indirect price effects can yield significant total price effects from clean-up, 
but much noise remains and the results are highly sensitive to model specification.  
Similar results hold for the alternative model.16  The preferred model points to a +7.8% 
total price effect from clean-ups, with a -9.5% direct and a +17.3% indirect price effect. 
The net result is that clean-ups tend not to appear as an amenity, unless the clean-
up’s induced changes in neighborhood composition are also allowed to affect price.  
Throughout all of the models estimated, the direct price effect is never significant and 
positive, and their total price effects are also centered near zero.  (If the confidence 
interval around the full effect estimate was the same size as that of the direct effect, the 
full effect’s confidence interval would contain zero for all models.)  With a full set of 
controls in Models 4EG and 4EGa, even if the direct price effect appears to be negative 
on average, the indirect effects bring the net price effect to positive through neighborhood 
change.  Much noise surrounds these estimates.   
The Models 3’ and 3a’ offer useful reference points, as they use a sample 
restriction to severely limit the comparison group.  Among these observations eligible for 
receiving an NPL remediation, the direct price effect appears small, negative, and 
insignificant, whereas the full price effect appears positive and small (~4%).  Though 
mixed, there is some evidence for positive indirect (not direct) price effects of NPL 
remediation during the 1990s. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
V. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we consider the price effects of changes in environmental quality in 
two important dimensions often overlooked in the literature.  First, we explicitly model 
neighborhoods (block groups) as panel data in a first-difference model.  This allows for 
better controls of omitted variables and allows explicit estimation of within-observation 
covariation in prices and environmental change.  Second, we treat important attributes of 
the neighborhood (S and N) as simultaneously determined.  We estimate the direct and 
indirect pathways through which changes in environmental quality can affect prices.  The 
evidence suggests that there are weak indirect effects on prices through induced changes 
in S and N in this context. 
 While hedonic prices may be relatively easy to compute, using these estimates as 
predictions of policy effects requires great care.  Hedonic prices derived from variation in 
environmental quality (E) across units are often interpreted as marginal willingness to 
pay to improve E.  This marginal price, β, clears the market when households choose 
among properties with varying environmental quality.  Yet, many unobserved attributes 
of housing likely correlate with E.  Repeat-sales using panel data can help researchers 
avoid attributing price effects of these unobservables to policy interventions.  More 
importantly, as the results here suggest, even unbiased estimates of β may be 
inappropriate for predicting the price effects of a change in E.  An estimated β that 
explains between-observation variation in price may be a poor predictor of within-
observation price changes in response to changes in E.  Shocks to E may induce shifts in 
housing and other markets, and the joint determination of several important variables like 
price and neighborhood composition.  An estimator that reflects the partial price effect, 
holding key neighborhood composition variables fixed, may overlook significant changes 
in those variables induced by the policy intervention.   
 In principle, estimating richer models of the joint determination of prices, 
neighborhood composition, and environmental quality can offer important insight into 
these indirect effects.  This paper estimated those rich models for a major brownfields 
clean-up program, one which has cost taxpayers roughly $30 billion (Greenstone and 
Gallagher 2005), and finds mixed evidence of significant direct or indirect price effects.  
If Superfund has any positive impact on property values, it seems that it must come 
through induced changes in housing stock and neighborhood composition.  How these 
indirect effects should be used in, say, a cost-benefit analysis depends on the context.  If a 
clean-up attracts housing investment or high-income families, some of that investment 
and in-migration is coming at the expense of other areas.  Thus, these indirect effects 
should be used judiciously by policy-makers interested in efficiency.  More local interests 
may care less about effects in other areas or markets.   
 Although evidence on price effects is weak here, estimating the structural models 
(equation 7) reveals much more information than just price effects.  The effects of EPA 
clean-ups on neighborhood composition, as local housing markets adjust to changes in 
the urban environment, can be seen in the bottom panels of Tables 4 and 4a.  In our 
preferred model (4EG), remediations tended to attract a rising share of minorities and 
renters to the neighborhood.17  Remediations do not explain changes in income, 
education, or percent children.  These empirical results contribute to the growing 
literature on neighborhood transition and environmental change (e.g., Banzhaf and Walsh 
2006, Cameron and McConnaha 2006).   
These findings also have important implications for the environmental justice 
debate.  Ringquist (2006) reviews much of the evidence on the spatial correlation of 
disamenities and demographic groups, both in static and dynamic settings.  He finds little 
evidence in the literature that observed inequitable distributions result from sorting 
induced by environmental change, though his review does not consider the recent 
research mentioned here (e.g., Banzhaf and Walsh 2006).  The results in the bottom panel 
of Table 4 suggest that some sorting does indeed take place following environmental 
change.  Remediations precede demographic shifts in neighborhoods, although the shifts 
are small and perhaps act in unexpected directions.  After a site is removed from the 
NPL, the share of minority residents nearby increases.  This suggests that remediating 
brownfields may pave the way for certain demographic groups to move into newly 
cleaned areas.  Conversely, these effects also imply that attempts to catalyze urban 
renewal with brownfield remediation may not lead to the intended outcomes.  As is 
common, individual and market behavior can undermine the best of policy intentions.  
Original residents may depart and new residents may arrive.  Moreover, their ability to 
capture any property value appreciation depends on ownership, and the results in Table 
4a hint at new rental housing following remediations. 
The present research invites further inquiry into simultaneous neighborhood and 
environmental change.  A more robust system would better control for endogeneity in 
listing and remediation of NPL sites.  A general equilibrium approach might also model 
other important markets, such as the labor market, to fully assess the expected price 
changes associated with remediation.  Recent applications to air quality (e.g., Bayer et al. 
2003, Sieg et al. 2004) demonstrate the utility of general equilibrium models in 
examining joint environmental and neighborhood change.  Certainly micro-level data 
would allow for more useful estimates and validation of our findings in local markets.  
Whether price effects of NPL sites vary across sites or metropolitan areas, perhaps using 
a random coefficients framework, warrants additional attention following on Kiel and 
Williams (2006).   
More generally, the approach taken here can be extended to other contexts to 
enrich the use of hedonic estimates to guide and evaluate public policy.  The evidence on 
Superfund clean-ups on property values is weak and inconsistent – adding to recent 
findings by Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) and Kiel and Williams (2006).  More than 
reinforcing these studies, our approach models a large and complex set of relationships 
extending well beyond price effects.  This promises a more detailed picture of the 
neighborhood dynamics following environmental change.  Although Superfund clean-ups 
had relatively small and inconsistent impacts on many variables, as with price, this sort of 
approach may yield great insights in other applications.  For example, Shapiro’s (2005) 
recent analysis of air toxics models risk changes as a function of static demographic 
variables.  As this paper demonstrates, a simultaneous approach with changes in 
demographic variables is likely to produce different, and much richer, results.  Finally, 
the sensitivity of our results to different assumptions about policy endogeneity indicates 
that this is no small concern in the case of Superfund.  How listings or clean-ups are 
assigned is crucial to both identifying the many impacts of the policy and generalizing 
from observed impacts at one site to another. 
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Endnotes 
1 Chattopadhyay et al. (2005), Clark and Nieves (1994), Dale et al. (1999), Deaton and Hoehn (2004), 
Gayer et al. (2000), Ketkar (1992), Kiel (1995), Kiel and Williams (2007), Kiel and Zabel (2001), 
Kohlhase (1991), McCluskey and Rausser (2003), Mendelsohn et al. (1992) and Michaels and Smith 
(1990). 
2 This approach is essentially a partial adjustment model for S.  Let S* be the (unobserved) equilibrium and 
S*=f(P, N, E, M, G)+θ, such that the observed St – St-1 = δ[St* – St-1].  Thus, Equation (3) in levels can be 
written as St  = (1–δ)St-1 + δf(.) + δθt.  Equation (4) is merely the first-differencing of this equation for an f 
linear in its arguments.   
3 The partial correlation of E and S  would depend on whether housing and environmental quality are 
complements or substitutes. 
4 The assumption of no endogeneity in (4) would be represented by zeros in the off-diagonal elements of 
the coefficient matrix except in the first row. 
5 The total effect of changes in E on appreciation rates is given as Equation (8a):   
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6 A national sample, while arguably lumping multiple markets together, moves away from the single-
market analyses that dominate this literature and provide little more than case studies.  This approach has 
both strengths and weaknesses.  In this, we follow the leads of Greenstone and Gallagher (2005), Bayer et 
al. (2005), and Kiel and Williams (2006) in using a large geographic sample.  The nature of the problem, 
sorting within and across housing markets, necessitates exploring multiple regions simultaneously.  
Ekeland et al.’s (2002) skepticism about justifying a segmented markets approach provides additional 
motivation for including a national sample in the same estimation.  In all of our models, we allow for 
separate market trends by estimating the price equation with metropolitan-area fixed effects.  Further, in 
some models, we estimate metropolitan-area-specific distance gradients as well.  Regardless, the average 
effect across all clean-ups is of primary interest here, and this warrants the use of a national sample. 
7 See Shultz and King (2001) for additional review of the use of aggregated census data in hedonics.  
Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) use a similar data set for similar purposes, although they use the larger 
geography of the census tract. 
8 Up to this point, we have been assuming that environmental quality is exogenous.  This simplifies the 
discussion.  We will discuss this assumption, and relax it, later in the paper. 
9 All models estimated here control for MSA-level fixed effects in all equations in the system.  It should be 
emphasized that, when it is specified that G is included in the model by relaxing the assumption of fixed 
prices, this relaxation is applied only to the price equation.  The G vector enters the price equation only, not 
the other equations for S  and N  in Equation (7) or (7a).  
10 There are a few exceptions because of changes in the census.  First is the percent of units in structures 
containing four or fewer units.  Because of coding changes between census years, the twice-lagged value 
and once-lagged difference are not available.  Instead we use the twice-lagged level and once-lagged 
difference of the percent of housing units in structures with nine or less housing units.  Second, because of 
the changes in definition of race and ethnicity between the 1990 and 2000 censuses, the percent white 
variable might not be precisely comparable across these decades.  Also, while in 1990 and 2000 the data on 
education are reported for person’s aged 25 or older, in 1980 they are reported for those 18 and over, so 
again, the lagged variable is not exactly identical in definition to the endogenous variables. 
11 Other 1980 measures include: median household income; per-capita income; median year built of 
housing units; median rent; median housing value; percents of housing units vacant, with complete 
plumbing, with complete kitchens, with gas or electric heat, not sharing structure with other units, sharing 
structure with 9 or less units, boarded up, with a telephone, with at least 2 bathrooms, with no air 
conditioner, and with central air conditioner; percents of population that is white, aged 18 or less, aged 65 
or more, and with income < 1.5 times poverty line; percent of households that are renters; percent of 
household with no vehicles; percent of adult population with at least bachelor’s degree; percent of 
population aged at least 25 with no HS degree; average commute travel time (in minutes); number of 
bedrooms per housing unit; number of rooms per housing unit; housing units per mile2; population per 
mile2; population per housing unit; population per room; percent of workers employed in “industrial” 
sectors; percent of vacant residences that are boarded up; percent of occupied housing units with 
telephones; ln(median housing value); ln(median contract rent); ln(median household income); ln(per-
capita income); population density2; and MSA population. 
12 Ideally, the possibility of time-varying βS and βN could also be explored, but including additional 
endogenous regressors (St-1 and Nt-1) in the price equation would leave the system underidentified without 
resorting to additional arbitrary exclusion restrictions.  The results thus depend on the assumption that 
significant implicit price changes do not occur if that attribute is correlated with remediation. 
13 The instruments used to identify the system in Equation (7) work well, as expected.  Staiger and Stock 
(1997) suggest first-stage F-statistics as indicators of instrument strength.  The first-stage regressions in the 
3SLS estimation for Models 3 and 4 all yield F-statistics greater than 20 for 38 out of 39 equations, with 
most F-statistics well exceeding 100.  Another concern is that the exclusion restrictions overidentify the 
system.  In Models 3 and 4, the price equation has 19 endogenous variables and 20 exclusion restrictions.  
The Sargan test statistics (distributed χ2 with 1 degree of freedom) for the P  equations, estimating in 
2SLS, in Models 3 and 4 range between 57 and 67.  These large statistics give some concern that the 
system is overidentified.  Consequently, using this instrument set cannot rule out the endogeneity of E  in 
the price equation.  It does, however, appear to be exogenous in many of the other equations in the system.  
Among a restricted sample of neighborhoods with or near NPL sites in 1990, the exogeneity of E  cannot 
be rejected in the price equation for Model 3’ based on the C-statistic in 2SLS.  Overall, the diagnostic 
statistics for the system estimations in Models 3 – 4 point to strong instruments and only moderate concerns 
about overidentification. 
14 The system diagnostics in the alternative models (Models 3a – 4EGa) are similar to the diagnostics for 
the standard models (Models 3 – 4EG).  The instruments all appear quite strong based on first-stage F-
statistics.  The overidentification tests, based on the Sargan statistic calculated from 2SLS estimation, are 
the same for the price equation – where models 3 and 3a are identical – and are zero for the S and N 
equations because they are just-identified.  As in Model 3’, however, restricting the sample size to only 
block groups with or near NPL sites in 1990 in Model 3a’ appears to solve the overidentification problem.  
With the Sargan statistic for the price equation in 3a’ below 0.50, the small C-statistic is also consistent 
with the exogeneity of E  in the price equation of model 3a’.   
15 Incidentally, this result likely does not owe to the choice of comparison group.  When the sample is 
restricted to only the 10,645 neighborhoods with or near NPL sites, the direct price effect of Model 4EG is 
-0.9836 (z-statistic = -3.72).  Clean-ups adversely affect property values even more strongly among the 
subsample.  This result suggests a possible explanation for the negative price effect:  the hazardous waste 
site is a disamenity that harms property values, inclusion in Superfund improves property values, and de-
listing it removes the government support without removing the disamenity associated with the site.  This 
may be because the market valued the eyesore more than the health risk, and the EPA only remediated the 
latter despite high hopes about the former.  The negative price effect of de-listing thus reflects, perhaps, a 
sense of abandonment of the site or neighborhood and only the stigma remains.  Perhaps with a longer 
time-lag after clean-up the negative price effects will dissipate and even become positive.  Among these 
block-groups enjoying a de-listing, the median years passed since deletion is only 2.76. 
16 Large and positive indirect effects are observed for Model 4EGa.  The magnitude of the indirect effects 
in Model 4EGa is comparable to its corresponding indirect effects in Model 4EG.  The total price effect in 
Model 4EGa is estimated to be 4.5%, which is close to the 4.0% estimate from Model 3a’ and roughly 
similar to the 7.8% effect from Model 4EG.  Again, as before, the alternative model does not tend to yield 
positive and significant direct price effects.  The full effects in Models 3, 3’, 4G, and 4EG are roughly 
consistent with the corresponding estimates in the alternative model.  The most glaring difference arises in 
comparing Models 4 and 4a.  Both exhibit small, positive, and insignificant direct price effects, but the 
indirect effect is -9.8% in Model 4 and is 16.0% in Model 4a.  Including P  in the non-price equations, 
without controlling for Et-1 or G, greatly affects the results.  Overall, similar conclusions hold in the 
alternative model: positive direct price effects are not observed; and significant indirect price effects can be 
observed, but they are very sensitive to model specification. 
17 These effects are a bit stronger in Model 4EGa.  Yet under the assumption that clean-ups are exogenous 
in Model 3 or Model 3’, clean-ups appear largely orthogonal to demographic trends.  
Table 3: OLS models of P  equation 
Model 1 1’ 2 2G 2EG 
Vectors included 
S , N , M , 
E  
S , N , M , 
E  
S , N , M , 
Eˆ  
S , N , M , 
Eˆ , G  
S , N , M , 
Eˆ , E , G  
N: 198625 10863 196096 194992 194992 
First-differenced variables: β β β β β 
Year built 0.0013 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0013 *** 
Rooms 0.1275 *** 0.1250 *** 0.1272 *** 0.1066 *** 0.1066 *** 
Utility heat (%) 0.1927 *** 0.0956 ** 0.1997 *** 0.2112 *** 0.2110 *** 
Housing densitya -0.0026 -0.0135 -0.0025 -0.0004 -0.0004 
Small structures (%) -0.1525 *** -0.0171 -0.1494 *** -0.1522 *** -0.1522 *** 
Plumbing (%) 0.2738 *** 0.1389 0.2640 *** 0.2039 *** 0.2039 *** 
Bedrooms -0.0729 *** -0.0647 ** -0.0746 *** -0.0472 *** -0.0472 *** 
Solo unit (%) -0.0998 *** -0.0420 -0.1037 *** -0.0743 *** -0.0744 *** 
Income 0.1739 *** 0.1320 *** 0.1755 *** 0.1615 *** 0.1615 *** 
White (%) 0.1855 *** 0.1058 *** 0.1864 *** 0.1605 *** 0.1605 *** 
College (%) 0.0915 *** 0.1614 ** 0.0938 *** 0.1349 *** 0.1351 *** 
Poor (%) -0.1210 *** -0.1005 * -0.1255 *** -0.0973 *** -0.0972 *** 
Blue collar (%) 0.0833 *** 0.2120 *** 0.0809 *** 0.0400 *** 0.0400 *** 
Renter (%) 0.0608 *** 0.0782 0.0609 *** 0.0527 *** 0.0525 *** 
Children (%) -0.0224 -0.1625 ** -0.0166 -0.0016 -0.0016 
Commute -0.0003 * -0.0015 ** -0.0003 ** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 ** 
No vehicle (%) -0.0646 *** 0.1696 ** -0.0639 *** -0.0784 *** -0.0782 *** 
Population densitya 0.0001 0.0094 * 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0010 
Household size 0.0002 -0.0039 ** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
M  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NPL in 1990, own/adjacent        0.0087 
Clean-up, own/adjacent (βE) 0.0368 
*** 0.0424 *** 0.0065 -0.0057 0.0580 
Natural amenity scale     -0.0113 *** -0.0113 *** 
MSA & distance interactions       Yes Yes 
  constant -0.0001 0.0015 -0.0005 0.0084 0.0084 
R2 0.1911 0.2322 0.1939 0.2234 0.2252 
 
Table 4: Results for P  equation and selected results for other equations 
Model 3 3’ 4 4G 4EG 
Vectors included: 
S , N , M ,
E  
S , N , M ,
E  
S , N , M ,
Eˆ  
S , N , M ,
Eˆ , G  
S , N , M ,
Eˆ , 1−tE , G  
N: 197050 10779 195293 194992 194992 
First-differenced variables: β β β β β 
Year built 0.0059 *** 0.0078 *** 0.0045 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0044 *** 
Rooms 0.0235 1.5874 *** 0.0046 -0.0695 ** -0.0730 ** 
Utility heat (%) -0.4397 *** 0.2729 -0.4400 *** -1.0336 *** -1.0198 *** 
Housing densitya -0.0138 2.3110 *** -0.0021 -0.0437 ** -0.0414 ** 
Small structures (%) 1.3312 *** 4.9288 *** 1.8352 *** 3.3732 3.3777 *** 
Plumbing (%) 10.0976 *** -32.0523 *** 9.0514 *** -1.0000 0.1434 
Bedrooms -0.9888 *** -1.1482 * -0.8858 *** 0.1641 *** 0.1328 
Solo unit (%) -4.5379 *** 0.7530 -4.7393 *** -6.9482 ** -6.9409 *** 
Income 0.9667 *** -4.2801 *** 1.1223 *** 0.2351 *** 0.2776 *** 
White (%) -0.8743 *** -3.1763 *** -0.9003 *** -0.6964 -0.6813 *** 
College (%) -0.3866 ** 1.4409 -0.2206 -0.0375 *** -0.1230 
Poor (%) 1.5293 *** -13.4137 *** 1.4343 *** -1.6301 -1.3677 *** 
Blue collar (%) 1.1617 *** 0.6513 0.8935 *** 0.2590 0.4109 ** 
Renter (%) 1.1874 *** 5.1639 ** 1.2317 *** 0.1673 * 0.2262 
Children (%) -3.7740 *** -4.7040 -3.6140 *** -0.8175 *** -0.8780 ** 
Commute 0.0191 *** 0.0342 0.0212 *** 0.0518 *** 0.0513 *** 
No vehicle (%) -3.1385 *** -1.7474 -2.7322 *** -2.4506 *** -2.6370 *** 
Population densitya 0.0383 *** -0.5593 ** 0.0331 *** 0.0942 *** 0.0951 *** 
Household size 0.0896 *** 0.0127 0.0777 *** -0.0569 *** -0.0602 *** 
NPL in 1990, own/adjacent      0.0088 
Clean-up, own/adjacent (βE) 0.0318 
* -0.0426 0.0652 -0.0473 -0.0954 
  constant 0.0114 *** 0.0076 0.0101 *** 0.0058 0.0050 
      
Dependent variable: Partial effect of “Clean-up in or adjacent” by equation, i.e., γE or δE 
Year built 2.5461 ** -1.0998 17.6817 *** 6.9839 *** 0.9461 
Rooms 0.0393 0.0273 0.1494 0.1149 *** 0.2146 *** 
Utility heat (%) 0.0288 *** -0.0132 0.0962 *** 0.0449 *** 0.0933 *** 
Housing density 7.7698 4.0814 -264.906 -155.829 *** -64.843 
Small structures (%) 0.0067 ** 0.0119 0.0467 *** -0.0016 0.0150 
Plumbing (%) -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0133 *** -0.0121 *** -0.0011 
Bedrooms -0.0253 0.0248 -0.1626 * -0.0300 -0.1013 *** 
Solo unit (%) -0.0075 0.0006 -0.0306 0.0005 0.0004 
Income -0.0155 0.0114 -0.1115 ** -0.0695 *** -0.0241 
White (%) -0.0245 -0.0072 -0.4895 *** -0.0236 -0.0465 * 
College (%) -0.0262 0.0069 -2.0040 *** 0.0158 -0.0103 
Poor (%) -0.0004 -0.0041 0.0110 -0.0262 *** -0.0005 
Blue collar (%) -0.0083 * 0.0070 -0.0448 *** -0.0174 * -0.0144 
Renter (%) 0.0085 0.0049 0.0108 0.0149 0.0338 * 
Children (%) -0.0048 -0.0011 0.0374 0.0081 -0.0071 
Commute -0.4155 0.1577 -3.1187 *** -0.7774 -1.9675 ** 
No vehicle (%) 0.0017 -0.0028 0.0486 *** 0.0118 -0.0136 
Population density 2.7180 -48.4256 134.3119 234.5556 92.8298 
Household size 0.0295 -0.0197 -0.6007 -0.1538 -0.5178 
      
a measured as 1000s/mi2 
***, **, * for p<0.01, <0.05, <0.10, respectively 
Table 4a: Results for P  equation and selected results for other equations, alternative 
model 
Model 3a 3a’ 4a 4Ga 4EGa 
Vectors included: 
S , N , M ,
E  
S , N , M ,
E  
S , N , M ,
Eˆ  
S , N , M ,
Eˆ , G  
S , N , M ,
Eˆ , 1−tE , G  
N: 197050 10779 196096 194992 194992 
First-differenced variables: β β β β β 
Year built 0.0043 *** 0.0058 * 0.0034 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0049 *** 
Rooms 0.0830 0.9428 ** 0.0630 0.2086 *** 0.2062 *** 
Utility heat (%) -0.3286 *** -0.3296 -0.3351 *** -0.8062 *** -0.7859 *** 
Housing densitya 0.0130 1.4698 0.0219 -0.0989 *** -0.0957 *** 
Small structures (%) 2.0775 *** 2.4964 1.8635 *** 3.3629 *** 3.3891 *** 
Plumbing (%) 3.4392 -18.3533 * 4.0472 -0.7552 0.4104 
Bedrooms -0.7231 *** -0.7002 -0.7151 *** -0.4023 *** -0.4428 *** 
Solo unit (%) -3.9948 *** -1.7865 -3.9726 *** -5.3543 *** -5.3370 *** 
Income 0.9474 *** -1.9055 0.9763 *** -0.0561 -0.0046 
White (%) -0.9552 *** -1.5075 -0.9042 *** -0.8585 *** -0.8470 *** 
College (%) -0.2788 -1.1039 -0.3456 * 0.0429 -0.0329 
Poor (%) -0.2505 -7.6720 * -0.1822 -2.5823 *** -2.3059 *** 
Blue collar (%) 0.4034 0.6094 0.4422 0.7622 *** 0.9162 *** 
Renter (%) 0.5873 ** 0.3469 0.5085 * 0.7643 *** 0.8538 *** 
Children (%) -1.5207 *** 0.1076 -1.4861 *** -1.1289 *** -1.2416 *** 
Commute 0.0067 -0.0102 0.0061 0.0172 *** 0.0160 *** 
No vehicle (%) -1.5077 *** -0.1889 -1.4797 *** -2.5275 *** -2.7198 *** 
Population densitya 0.0096 -0.3268 0.0125 0.1068 *** 0.1074 *** 
Household size 0.0288 0.0093 0.0306 -0.0638 *** -0.0644 *** 
NPL in 1990, own/adjacent     0.0281 *** 
Clean-up, own/adjacent (βE) 0.0270 -0.0159 0.0191 -0.0181 -0.2073 
*** 
  constant -0.0055 ** 0.0089 0.0054 ** -0.0044 -0.0048 
      
Dependent variable: Partial effect of “Clean-up in or adjacent” by equation, i.e., γE or δE 
Year built 0.1261 2.0354    10.5347 *** 6.0890 *** 4.3927 * 
Rooms 1.3197 ** 0.0169 3.4809 * 0.1063 *** 0.2507 *** 
Utility heat (%) 0.0353 *** 0.0400    0.0963 *** 0.0448 *** 0.0940 *** 
Housing density -336.897    10.0214 422.8006     -146.708 *** -100.9781 
Small structures (%) -0.0114 0.0069  -0.0037 -0.0024 0.0255 *** 
Plumbing (%) -0.0073  -0.0010 -0.0045 -0.0110 *** 0.0036 
Bedrooms 0.0090 -0.0233  -0.0374   -0.0232 -0.1300 *** 
Solo unit (%) 0.0030 -0.0068 -0.0056  0.0027 -0.0194 * 
Income -0.0236  0.0927  -0.0728 -0.0643 *** -0.0076 
White (%) -0.0132 0.0002  -0.2422  *** -0.0153 -0.0638 ** 
College (%) -0.6789  -0.0114 -2.2250 0.0172 * -0.0160 
Poor (%) -0.0462 ** -0.0021 -0.1754  ** -0.0213 *** -0.0029 
Blue collar (%) 0.0309  -0.3348 0.1945  * -0.0138 0.0103 
Renter (%) -0.0078 0.0327 -0.0072  0.0135 0.0465 ** 
Children (%) 0.0563 0.0200  0.7671  * 0.0083 -0.0158 
Commute 0.4030 3.1192  -2.8637 -0.7646 -1.8354 ** 
No vehicle (%) -0.0544 *** 0.8093 0.1432  *** 0.0093 -0.0316 ** 
Population density 2507.145     -48.7680    5866.63     188.3875 677.8631 * 
Household size -0.0396    1.3606 -0.9646    -0.1147 -0.3077 
      
a measured as 1000s/mi2 
***, **, * for p<0.01, <0.05, <0.10, respectively 
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Table 5: Summary of direct and full price effects of clean-up actions 
Model Vectors included E  
Direct effect 
∂P/∂E 
Indirect 
effect 
Full effect 
dP/dE 
3 S , N , M , E  clean-up in own or adjacent block group 0.0318 -0.0165 0.0153 
3’ S , N , M , E  clean-up in own or adjacent block group -0.0426 0.0802 0.0376## 
4 S , N , M , Eˆ  
instrumented clean-up in own or 
adjacent block group 0.0652 -0.0976 -0.0324 
4G S , N , M , Eˆ , G  
instrumented clean-up in own or 
adjacent block group -0.0473 0.0851 0.0378 
4EG S , N , M , Eˆ , 1−tE , G  
instrumented clean-up in own or 
adjacent block group -0.0954 0.1734 0.0780
## 
Alternative model 
3a S , N , M , E  clean-up in own or adjacent block group 0.0270 0.0284 0.0554 
3a’ S , N , M , E  clean-up in own or adjacent block group -0.0159 0.0556 0.0397 
4a S , N , M , Eˆ  
instrumented clean-up in own or 
adjacent block group 0.0191 0.1600 0.1791
## 
4Ga S , N , M , Eˆ , G  
instrumented clean-up in own or 
adjacent block group -0.0181 0.0348 0.0167 
4EGa S , N , M , Eˆ , 1−tE , G  
instrumented clean-up in own or 
adjacent block group -0.2073
** 0.2523 0.0450## 
** indicates significance at the 5% level.  ## indicates full effect is outside of the direct effect’s 95% confidence interval. 
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